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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003001

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NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2015

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SUBJECT: NAVIGATING THE RIFT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAN -  
RUBAIE ON THE UIA'S BALANCING ACT

REF: A. DIA IIR 6 847 0115 05

[B.](#) DIA IIR 6 847 0125 05

Classified By: Political-Military Affairs Counselor David C. Litt for r  
easons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

[¶1.](#) (S//NF) SUMMARY. During a routine office call, National Security Advisor Mouwaffak Al-Rubaie discussed the development of a strategic security alliance with Iran to assist Iraq in combating the Sunni insurgency. Rubaie stated that while more right-wing elements of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) were advocating such a relationship, a more moderate position held sway among principal SCIRI and Dawa leaders who believe that movement too far in this direction would antagonize the U.S. The ITG, however, is considering legislation to establish a new Ministry of Intelligence to replace the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) possibly headed by State Minister of National Security Abdul Kareem Al-Anzi, the primary advocate for intelligence sharing with Iran. Rubaie identified Iran's nuclear program and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC's) support of Hamas and Hizballah to be the principal issues standing in the way of a constructive rapprochement between Iran and the U.S. He confided that he was aware of IRGC activities in Iraq, calling them a "great danger". Ironically, according to Rubaie, the IRGC credentials of newly elected Iranian President Mahmud Ahmedinejad may afford him the flexibility to make the tough decisions required to overcome the mutual distrust that has characterized the Iran-U.S. relationship since 1979. END SUMMARY

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MAINTAINING A PRECARIOUS BALANCE AS JAFARI COURTS IRAN  
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[¶2.](#) (S//NF) In a conversation on 18 July with Iraqi National Security Advisor Mowaffak Al-Rubaie, POLMILOFF inquired about reports that Prime Minister Ibrahim Al-Jafari and State Minister for National Security Abdul Kareem Al-Anzi were seeking to establish a security alliance and intelligence-sharing agreement with Iran. Rubaie stated that that there was a spectrum of views on this issue within the cadre of UIA advisors to the Prime Minister. At the conservative end of the spectrum, the strongly anti-Ba'athist camps of Ahmad Chalabi, Muqtada Al-Sadr, and the more radical elements of SCIRI are advocating Iranian assistance to defeat the Ba'athist-driven insurgency, even if, as in the case of Al-Sadr, this represents a reversal of an otherwise strongly nationalistic agenda. At its core, their view stems from a frustration with the Coalition's ability to fathom the nature of the Sunni insurgency, and their lack of willingness to take the necessary steps to defeat it.

[¶3.](#) (S//NF) At the other end, typified by more progressive elements of Dawa and other independents, are those voices which consider any relationship with Iran anathema and a threat to harmonious relations with the Coalition. The middle ground is held by SCIRI and Dawa centrists who, while predisposed to develop such a relationship with Iran, are hesitant to risk compromising any good faith thus far developed with the U.S. Rubaie agreed with POLMILOFF's supposition that this must be a very tenuous line to hold, attempting to appease both Tehran and Washington simultaneously.

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REENGINEERING IRAQI INTELLIGENCE  
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[¶4.](#) (S//NF) Rubaie confirmed that in addition to these bilateral relationships, the ITG Council of Ministers was deliberating upon proposed legislation to create a

new Ministry of Intelligence, reportedly to be anchored around the nucleus of advisors to State Minister for National Security, Al-Anzi. Politically reliable elements of the existing INIS are to be salvaged and incorporated into this new organization. Rubaie appeared to be in opposition to the idea, believing that though the INIS was compromised by former regime elements and in need of more thorough vetting and organizational restructuring, it did not warrant the creation of a new bureaucracy in favor of an existing one.

**15.** (S//NF) The Council of Ministers, according to Rubaie, had yet to achieve consensus on the issue, with the Kurds in significant opposition. The issue had been tabled for discussion at the Ministerial Council for National Security (MCNS) meeting scheduled for 21 July. POLMILLOFF suggested that a new organization revolving around Al-Anzi, the premier advocate for close intelligence cooperation with the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), may pose challenges for continued intelligence exchange between the Coalition and the ITG. Rubaie conceded that this could be a problem.

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CAN'T WE JUST ALL GET ALONG?  
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**16.** (S//NF) Rubaie segued by suggesting that a U.S. rapprochement with Iran would help ameliorate these tensions and serve the mutual interests of Iran and the U.S. in establishing a stable and secure Iraq. He specified Iran's nuclear program and IRGC support for Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas in the Levant as the primary issues of contention for the U.S. POLMILLOFF asked if IRGC activities in Iraq should also be a cause of concern. Rubaie stated that he was aware of IRGC's introduction of advanced IED technology into Iraq, and their substantial financial support to the Badr Organization and other militant political groups which had a stifling effect on the development of other Shia political voices which were not the beneficiaries of Iranian patronage. These activities are nearly impossible to counter, with limited inherent capability (or will) for the ITG to interdict them and the limits of engagement the Coalition has set for itself in promoting political parties. Rubaie called the IRGC a "great danger". (COMMENT. POLMILLOFF understood this to mean a general threat to constructive multilateral relations, and not an explicit military threat. END COMMENT).

**17.** (S//NF) The National Security Advisor made clear, however, that the IRGC did not represent the 'political elites' of Iran, typified by Rafsanjani and Khatami, who are capable of being rational, thoughtful interlocutors with Washington. When asked whether former IRGC officer and newly-elected president Mahmud Ahmedinejad fit into that category, Rubaie responded with a flourish of rhetorical acrobatics. Citing the Likud party, he stated that politics in Israel are not entirely different from politics in Iran, and just as the conservatives in Israel have been able to make the tough decisions to effect progress, perhaps too, Ahmedinejad's conservative credibility may afford him the flexibility to take the bold steps necessary to overcome the residual psychological baggage of those hardly forgotten 444 days.

**18.** (U) REO BASRAH, REO HILLAH, REO MOSUL and REO KIRKUK minimize considered.  
Satterfield